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&THEUPCOMING ERA of pervasive computing will be
characterized by many smart devices that—because
of the tight cost constraints inherent in mass deploy-
ments—have very limited resources in terms of
memory, computing power, and battery supply. Here,
it’s necessary to interpret Moore’s law differently:
Rather than a doubling of performance, we see
a halving of the price for constant computing power
every 18 months. Because many foreseen applications
have extremely tight cost constraints—for example,
RFID in tetrapacks—over time, Moore’s law will
increasingly enable such applications. Many applica-
tions will process sensitive health-monitoring or bio-
metric data, so the demand for cryptographic compo-
nents that can be efficiently implemented is strong and
growing. For such implementations, as well as for
ciphers that are particularly suited for this purpose, we
use the generic term lightweight cryptography in this
article.
Every designer of lightweight cryptography must
cope with the trade-offs between security, cost, and
performance. It’s generally easy to optimize any two of
the three design goals—security and cost, security and
performance, or cost and performance; however, it is
very difficult to optimize all three
design goals at once. For example,
a secure and high-performance hard-
ware implementation can be achieved
by a pipelined, side-channel-resistant
architecture, resulting in a high area
requirement, and thus high costs. On
the other hand, it’s possible to design
a secure, low-cost hardware implemen-
tation with the drawback of limited performance.
In this article, we present a selection of recently
published lightweight-cryptography implementations
and compare them to state-of-the-art results in their
field. This survey covers recent hardware and software
implementations of symmetric as well as asymmetric
ciphers. We will discuss software and hardware
implementations separately, because they have differ-
ent and sometimes contrary characteristics. For
example, bit permutations are virtually free in
hardware, whereas in software they can significantly
slow down implementations. Also, large substitution
tables are often software friendly, but hardware
realizations can be relatively costly. Finally, the
evaluation metric is different: For software implemen-
tations, we compare both RAM andROM requirements
and the required number of clock cycles. For
hardware implementations, we focus on the required
chip size and the number of clock cycles. We don’t
compare power consumption for the hardware
implementations, because different standard-cell tech-
nologies were used and estimates from simulating
environments are not accurate. Software implementa-
tions let us achieve a rough estimate of power
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consumption by multiplying the processing time by
the average power consumption of the target device.
Another distinction is between symmetric and
asymmetric ciphers, because the latter offer more
security functionality and therefore have different
application scenarios. Symmetric ciphers serve mainly
for message integrity checks, entity authentication,
and encryption, whereas asymmetric ciphers addi-
tionally provide key-management advantages and
nonrepudiation. Asymmetric ciphers are computation-
ally far more demanding, in both hardware and
software. The performance gap on constrained
devices such as 8-bit microcontrollers is huge. For
example, an optimized asymmetric algorithm such as
elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) performs 100 to
1,000 times more slowly than a standard symmetric
cipher such as the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) algorithm, which correlates with a two- to three-
orders-of-magnitude higher power consumption. Un-
like block ciphers, which are well investigated and
understood, stream ciphers have received little
attention from the scientific community. Although this
has recently started to change, we cite stream ciphers
only for comparison. (The increasing interest in stream
ciphers is apparent in projects such as eStream, within
the European Network of Excellence in Cryptography,
which aims to foster knowledge about stream ciphers.)
The ‘‘Related work’’ sidebar summarizes some recent
developments in lightweight cryptography.
Symmetric ciphers
Many works on symmetric ciphers have been
published during the past two decades. Because most
main applications of symmetric ciphers use software
implementations, it’s no surprise that nearly all
algorithms—for example, the AES—have been de-
veloped with good software performance in mind. The
paradigm shift that we foresee will likely lead to an
increasing demand for lightweight ciphers that per-
form well in hardware. Therefore, we focus here on
recently published works on ciphers that have been
developed for minimal hardware requirements—
namely, DESL1 and Present.2
Hardware implementations of symmetric ciphers
The only well-established cipher designed with
a strong focus on low hardware cost is the Data
Encryption Standard (DES). Comparing a standard
one-round implementation of AES and DES, we find
that the latter consumes only about 6% of the logic
resources of AES and has a shorter critical path.
However, researchers have described a low-power,
low-cost AES implementation that requires only 3,400
gate equivalents (GEs) and encrypts a plaintext within
1,032 clock cycles.3 This impressive result seems to
have achieved the limit in area minimization. This
implementation, as well as the implementations of
DESL and Present, features encryption only, because
encryption is sufficient for many lightweight target
applications, such as authentication with a challenge-
response protocol.
DES. Inspired by the one-round implementation
results of AES and DES, we implemented a serialized
version of DES that processes 4-bit and 6-bit data words
rather than those with 32 bits and 48 bits. Our
implementation requires 2,310 GEs and encrypts
a plaintext within 144 clock cycles.1 To our
knowledge, this is the smallest reported DES
implementation, sacrificing throughput to achieve
minimal area requirements. However, the 56-bit key
limits the security provided. Brute-forcing this key
space using software takes a few months and
hundreds of PCs, but only a few days with a special-
purpose machine such as Copacobana.4 Hence, this
implementation is relevant only for applications
needing short-term security or where the values
protected are relatively low. In certain low-cost
applications, such a security level is adequate. When
a higher security level is needed, so-called key
whitening, can be added to standard DES, yielding
DESX. The key-whitening technique requires only two
additional XOR gates: one gate to add a prewhitening
key to the plaintext before the cipher processes it, and
another to add a postwhitening key to the resulting
ciphertext. In the case of DES, this enlarges the key
space from 56 bits to 184 bits. However, because of
time-memory trade-offs (birthday attack), the security
level of DESX is bounded by 118 bits.
DESL and DESXL. In our serialized DES implemen-
tation, substitution boxes (S-boxes) take up approxi-
mately 32% of the area. We can further decrease the
gate complexity of DES by replacing the eight original
S-boxes with a single new one, eliminating seven S-
boxes as well as the multiplexer. This lightweight DES
variant is called DESL and results in an approximately
20% smaller chip than DES (1,850 GEs versus 2,310
GEs). The S-box has been carefully selected and highly
optimized, enabling DESL to resist common attacks
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such as linear and differential cryptanalysis and the
Davies-Murphy attack. Thus, DESL achieves a security
level appropriate for many applications. Key
whitening can be applied to strengthen the cipher,
yielding the DESXL cipher, with a security level of
approximately 118 bits. DESXL requires 2,170 GEs and
encrypts a plaintext within 144 clock cycles. (Further
details are available elsewhere.1)
Present. Besides efficiently implementing or slightly
modifying an established cipher, an alternative for
lightweight cryptography is to design a new hardware-
optimized cipher from scratch. We followed this
approach when designing Present, an SPN-based
(substitution permutation network) block cipher
with 32 rounds, a block size of 64 bits, and a key size
of 80 or 128 bits. The main design philosophy was
0
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Related work
There are many recent symmetric ciphers—for
example, Hight, Clefia, DESXL,1 and Present2—with
special implementation properties proposed. Hight was
first presented at the 2006 Workshop on Cryptographic
Hardware and Embedded Systems and was designed
with good hardware performance in mind. In their
paper, the authors provide hardware figures for a one-
round implementation—that is, one round is performed
in one cycle—and they conclude that Hight is well-
suited for ubiquitous computing devices such as
wireless sensor nodes and RFID tags. Their figures
show that Hight requires approximately the same chip
size as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
algorithm (3,048 versus 3,400 gate equivalents, or
GEs) but is much faster. However, figures for imple-
mentations with a smaller footprint in hardware are not
yet available. Clefia was designed with a broader
application range in mind—to perform well in both
hardware and software implementations. Two ciphers
especially optimized for software architectures are the
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) family and the In-
ternational Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA). They
consist only of arithmetic operations on 16-bit words
(IDEA) and 32-bit words (TEA). IDEA consists of
addition, XOR addition, and multiplication. The TEA
family uses only addition, XOR addition, and shifts. In
both cases, each operation can be implemented
efficiently on 8-bit platforms. Neither cipher uses
a substitution box (S-box), so they don’t need much
memory. The Scalable Encryption Algorithm (SEA) can
be parameterized according to processor size as well
as plaintext size and key size; the goal is to enable
efficient implementations on different platforms.
With respect to asymmetric algorithms on small
processors, Gura et al.3 make a key contribution,
comparing RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) and elliptic-
curve cryptography (ECC) on two different, commonly
used 8-bit CPUs: AVR (the Atmel ATmega128 platform)
and 8051 (the Chipcon CC1010 platform). They show
that for the Atmel ATmega128 clocked at 8 MHz, a point
multiplication using a 160-bit ECC GF(p) standard
curve required 0.81 second. A security equivalent
1,024-bit RSA encryption requires about 11 seconds.
Consequently, this article considers only ECC in the
asymmetric case. Although hyperelliptic curves hold
promise too, their lack of standardization makes them
less promising at the moment. Optimum extension
fields (OEFs), which can be parameterized for small
CPUs, offer an alternative method for fast ECC
implementations.4 Several hardware implementations
for standardized ECC have been suggested, but few
are aimed at low-end devices. Most implementations
focus on speed and, owing to their huge area
requirements, are suitable mostly for server-end appli-
cations only.5
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simplicity: No part of the cipher was
added without a good reason, such as
thwarting an attack. Figure 1 depicts
Present’s very simple design. Let’s take
the round counter XOR in the key
scheduling as an example of how to
thwart a whole class of attacks with
minimal area overhead. Hardware
designers favor repetition because it
lets them reuse parts of the chip and
hence reduce chip size. However, if the
key-update functions are similar in each
round, this property can be exploited by
related-key attacks. Among the possi-
bilities for achieving deviating round functions, we
chose the one that is most hardware efficient and
simple: adding a round-dependent constant in the key
scheduling. Because a round counter is needed
anyway, this constitutes no additional area
requirements; the XOR requires only 13 GEs.
Present, like any other SPN, comprises three stages:
a key-mixing step, a substitution layer, and a permuta-
tion layer. For the key mixing, we chose a simple XOR
because this operation can be implemented efficiently
in both hardware and software. The key schedule
consists essentially of a 61-bit rotation together with an
S-box and a round counter. (Present-80 uses a single S-
box, whereas Present-128 requires two S-boxes.) The
substitution layer comprises 16 S-boxes with 4-bit
inputs and 4-bit outputs (4 3 4). We decided to use
similar S-boxes in both the data path and the key
scheduling because we learned from DESL that this
can result in significant area savings when a serialized
implementation is desired. The choice of 4 3 4 rather
than 8 3 8 S-boxes was also hardware driven; 8-bit
S-boxes require about 40 times more area than 4-bit
S-boxes (1,000 GEs versus 25 GEs). However, 4-bit
S-boxes must be selected very carefully because they
are cryptographically weaker than 8-bit S-boxes.
Nevertheless, through careful selection, it’s possible
to achieve an appropriate security level. The permu-
tation layer is a very regular and simple bit trans-
position. It comes virtually free in hardware because it
is realized by simple wiring and hence needs no
transistors. The permutation layer ensures that an S-
box’s four output bits will be distributed to four distinct
S-boxes in the following round, which ensures the
avalanche effect. This is required to thwart linear and
differential cryptanalyses. (Further details are available
elsewhere.2)
Table 1 compares the implementation results of
various lightweight ciphers.
Software implementations of symmetric ciphers
The many design choices within the AES reflect the
wide discussion of efficient symmetric cryptography
for software implementations. Yet, for constrained
devices in particular, designers must take into account
the target platform’s special properties when choosing
cryptographic algorithms.
In many areas where cost and energy considera-
tions dominate, computational power comes in the
form of a small, inexpensive CPU. By a wide margin,
8-bit controllers have the largest share of the worldwide
CPU market. These small microcontrollers are con-
strained in program memory (flash or ROM), RAM,
clock speed, register width, and arithmetic capabilities.
In this context, efficiency means more than simply
throughput: Resources needed to implement a cipher
should be kept small. In fact, in many situations,
resource efficiency (measured mainly by memory
consumption) is more critical than throughput, espe-
cially because many embedded applications encrypt
only small payloads. Typically, these 8-bit microcon-
trollers offer as little as tens of kilobytes of program
memory, and sometimes less than 1 Kbyte of SRAM;
they usually operate at clock speeds of a few MHz.
Nevertheless, especially for battery-powered de-
vices, low computational complexity can be of great
value too because processing time directly correlates
with power consumption. Modern microcontrollers
can enter a variety of power-down and power-saving
modes as soon as they have finished computation.
Hence, a fast-executing algorithm can reduce energy
consumption and lengthen the lifetime of a battery-
powered device.
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Figure 1. Data path of the Present implementation. (S: substitution layer; P:
permutation layer.) (Source: Bogdanov et al.2)
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In this context, we compare the previously
discussed ciphers that are primarily optimized for
hardware with several software-friendly ciphers. For
comparison, we added two software-oriented stream
ciphers of the eStream project: Salsa20 and LEX.6 The
latter is a modified AES in which several bytes of the
intermediate states are extracted and used as a key
stream. Salsa20, like the Tiny Encryption Algorithm
(TEA) and the International Data Encryption Algo-
rithm (IDEA), is based on simple arithmetic opera-
tions. We chose these ciphers because their consump-
tion of ROM and RAM is suited for small embedded
processors. Stream ciphers usually have lengthy setup
phases. LEX needs only one AES encryption for setup,
and Salsa20’s setup phase is even shorter. Hence, these
ciphers can provide efficient encryption of the small
payloads often found in embedded systems. All the
discussed ciphers were implemented for 8-bit AVR
microcontrollers. AVRs are a popular family of 8-bit
RISC microcontrollers. The ATmega family offers 8
Kbytes to 128 Kbytes of flash memory and 1 Kbyte to 8
Kbytes of SRAM. The devices of the ATmega series
have 32 general-purpose registers with a word size of 8
bits. Most of the microcontrollers’ 130 instructions are
one cycle, and the microcontrollers can be clocked at
up to 16 MHz.
To keep the source code small, we used a straight-
forward approach for all our software implementa-
tions. Only the substitution tables are realized as
lookup tables (LUTs), where applicable, because this
provides an enormous speedup for reasonable mem-
ory consumption. Many fast software implementations
of ciphers use larger LUTs to achieve a higher
throughput. Unfortunately, this leads to an unaccept-
able increase in code size for many embedded
applications. The LUTs are stored in the program
memory (ROM). TEA, IDEA, and Salsa20 do not use
substitution tables, which allows for a smaller code.
For the inversion needed in IDEA, we used a slow but
extremely small algorithm. This explains the small
code as well as the huge discrepancy between
encryption and decryption time.
The results of our implementations appear in
Table 2. As expected, the software-oriented ciphers
perform better on our platform. We had problems
decreasing the code size of Hight, but it still shows
good encryption performance. Although Present
shows poor performance, its code, along with that of
IDEA, is extremely small. LEX is a modified AES cipher,
yet its code is smaller than that of AES because it lacks
the decryption part.
Considering the trade-offs between security, cost,
and performance, the stream ciphers seem to be
a good choice. LEX and Salsa20 do well in both
throughput and size, yet they are good choices only if
the encrypted payload is sufficiently large. Otherwise,
they produce a computational overhead because of
their huge block length and their setup phase.
When code size is extremely critical, TEA, IDEA,
and even Present seem to be reasonable choices. For
most other cases, AES again shows its strength in
software.
Asymmetric ciphers
Among public-key algorithms, there are three
established families of practical relevance: ECC, RSA
0
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Table 1. Comparison of lightweight ciphers.
Cipher
Key
bits
Block
bits
Cycles per
block
Throughput at
100 kHz (Kbps)
Logic
process
Area
(GEs)
Block ciphers
Present 80 64 32 200.00 0.18 mm 1,570
AES 128 128 1,032 12.40 0.35 mm 3,400
Hight 128 64 34 188.20 0.25 mm 3,048
Clefia 128 128 36 355.56 0.09 mm 4,993
mCrypton 96 64 13 492.30 0.13 mm 2,681
DES 56 64 144 44.40 0.18 mm 2,309
DESXL 184 64 144 44.40 0.18 mm 2,168
Stream ciphers
Trivium5 80 1 1 100.00 0.13 mm 2,599
Grain5 80 1 1 100.00 0.13 mm 1,294
*AES: Advanced Encryption Standard; DES: Data Encryption Standard; DESXL: lightweight DES with key whitening.
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(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), and discrete logarithms.
ECC is considered the most attractive family for
embedded environments because of its smaller
operand lengths and relatively lower computational
requirements. ECC has been accepted commercially
and has also been adopted by standardizing bodies
such as the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), the IEEE, the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), the Standards for Efficient
Cryptography Group (SECG), and the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
A lightweight elliptic-curve engine
Interest is growing in stand-alone asymmetric
cipher engines in small, constrained devices for
applications such as sensor networks and contactless
smart cards (for example, e-passports). This interest is
normally dictated by the need for better performance
to satisfy a communication protocol or energy
constraints.
Here, we present a hardware implementation of
a low-area, stand-alone, public-key processor for
standardized ECC curves, details of which can be
found elsewhere.7 We sacrifice flexibility to save area
by setting the design to fit a specific standardized
binary-field curve that is quite reasonable for con-
strained devices. Standardized binary fields that pro-
vide short-term security (113 bits), as well as fields that
are required for medium-term security applications
(193 bits), are implemented. For some constrained
applications, 113-bit fields provide adequate security.
The main reason for choosing a binary field rather
than a prime field is the carry-free arithmetic, which is
well-suited for hardware implementations. A second
reason is the simplified squaring structure, which is
a central idea used in the algorithms chosen for the
processor design.
Inversion. Itoh and Tsujii proposed the construction
of an addition chain such that the inversion could be
performed in O(log m) multiplications.8 Although the
algorithm was proposed for optimal normal-basis
implementations, where squarings are almost free
(cyclic rotations), the area requirement for the
squaring structure in our implementation is within
bounds but has the same timing efficiency of 1 clock
cycle as in the normal basis. Our algorithm exploits the
fact that squaring is very efficient in the standard basis
as long as the field is fixed. It’s easy to show that the
inverse A21 can then be obtained in (tlog2(m2 1)s +
Hw(m 2 1) 2 1) multiplications and (m 2 1)
squarings using this addition chain, where Hw
denotes the Hamming weight of the binary
representation.
Point multiplication.We used amodified version of
the Montgomery algorithm for implementing the
point multiplication. We require one inversion and
0
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Table 2. Comparison of software implementations of ciphers.
Cipher
Key
size
(bits)
Block
size
(bits)
Encryption
(cycles/
block)
Throughput
at 4 MHz
(Kbps)
Decryption
(cycles/
block)
Relative
throughput
(% of AES)
Code
size
(bytes)
SRAM
size
(bytes)
Relative
code size
(% of AES)
Hardware-oriented block ciphers
DES 56 64 8,633 29.6 8,154 38.4 4,314 0 152.4
DESXL 184 64 8,531 30.4 7,961 39.4 3,192 0 112.8
Hight 128 64 2,964 80.3 2,964 104.2 5,672 0 200.4
Present 80 64 10,723 23.7 11,239 30.7 936 0 33.1
Software-oriented block ciphers
AES 128 128 6,637 77.1 7,429 100.0 2,606 224 100.0
IDEA 128 64 2,700 94.8 15,393 123.0 596 0 21.1
TEA 128 64 6,271 40.8 6,299 53.0 1,140 0 40.3
SEA 96 96 9,654 39.7 9,654 51.5 2,132 0 75.3
Software-oriented stream ciphers
Salsa20 128 512 18,400 111.3 NA 144.4 1,452 280 61.2
LEX 128 320 5,963 214.6 NA 287.3 1,598 304 67.2
*IDEA: International Data Encryption Algorithm; TEA: Tiny Encryption Algorithm; SEA: Scalable Encryption Algorithm.
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four multiplications in each iteration. The algorithm
also lets us compute each iteration without requiring
extra temporary memory locations, thus reducing
area.
ECC processor design. The overall design appears
in Figure 2. The three units—GF(2m) addition;GF(2m)
multiplication, implemented as an MSB-first (most-
significant-bit) multiplier; and GF(2m) squaring—are
closely interconnected inside a single arithmetic unit
sharing the common input data bus A. The adder
needs an additional data bus B for the second operand,
and the multiplier requires a single-bit bi signal for the
multiplicand. The operands are stored in the memory
as registers (some of them as cyclic registers) with the
output being selected for A, B, and bi using
multiplexers with control signals (Asel, Bsel, and bi_sel)
from the controller. All the operand registers are
connected in parallel to data bus C, with the
appropriate register being loaded on the basis of the
controller load signal Cld_reg.
Inversion, as described, requires no additional
hardware apart from the preexisting multiplying unit
and squaring unit, with some additional control
circuitry to enable loading the proper variables to
the appropriate unit.
The implementation was synthesized for a custom
ASIC design using AMI Semiconductor 0.35-micron
CMOS technology. The designs have a total area
ranging from 10 K GEs for a 113-bit field for short-term
security to 18 K GEs for a 193-bit field for medium-term
security applications. This implementation shows that
an extremely small-area implementation of an ECC
processor is possible in affine coordinates. Table 3
shows the ECC processor’s total area in GEs and
latency in clock cycles for a single scalar multiplica-
tion and compares them with those of other imple-
mentations.9
Hardware-software codesign for ECC
An ECC coprocessor, as we’ve defined it, can be
small; it can also be prohibitively expensive for many
pervasive applications and can be capable of perfor-
mance that those applications don’t need. Hardware
assistance in the form of instruction set extensions
(ISEs) is more favorable in such situations because the
cost of extra hardware is quite low compared with that
of a coprocessor. Here, we present an efficient ISE
implementation for ECC that is a tightly coupled
hardware and software codesign. As a first step, we
used a software-only ECC implementation to identify
the functional elements and code segments that would
0
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Figure 2. Area-optimized GF(2m) elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) processor.
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provide efficiency gains if implemented as an ISE.
Then, a hardware model of the new processor
determined the effects of the new extension on such
parameters as execution time, code size, and data
RAM usage.
We used the AT94K family of field-programmable,
system-level ICs as a development platform. This
architecture integrates an AVR 8-bit microcontroller
core and FPGA resources on a single chip. We chose
the standardized 163-bit elliptic curve over GF(2m), as
recommended by NIST and ANSI. We used scalar
point multiplication over this curve for determining the
benefits of the ISE.
The pure software implementation was done first.
Table 4 includes the point arithmetic performance; it
shows that GF(2m) multiplication is the most costly
operation with respect to execution time and memory
requirement. Moreover, in the point multiplication
algorithms, field multiplications are extremely fre-
quent and therefore constitute the bottleneck opera-
tion for ECC. A closer analysis of the multiplication
block shows that most of the time was spent for load
and store operations because the small number of
registers available in the AVR processor could not hold
the large operands. Therefore, a hardware extension
for this functional block would potentially reduce the
memory bottleneck and speed up the ECC.
We present a completeGF(2163)multiplier as an ISE
requiring the minimum possible area. We implemen-
ted twomultiplier architectures that provide a trade-off
between performance and the extra area requirement.
The first is a 163 3 163 least-significant-bit-first
multiplier. The multiplier requires 163 AND gates, 167
XOR gates, and 489 flip-flops. A 163 3 163 multiplica-
tion computes in 163 clock cycles, excluding data
input and output. In our implementation, overhead
from control and memory access leads to a total
execution time of 313 clock cycles.
An additional trade-off between area and speed is
possible using the second option, a digit-serial multipli-
0
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Table 3. ECC processor performance for scalar multiplication.
Source Field
Total area
(GEs)
Technology
(mm)
Frequency
(MHz)
Time
(ms)
This work GF (2113) 10,113 0.35 13.560 14.4
GF (2131) 11,970 0.35 13.560 18.0
GF (2163) 15,094 0.35 13.560 31.8
GF (2193) 17,723 0.35 13.560 41.7
Batina et al. GF (267)2 12,944 0.25 0.175 2,390.0
GF (2131) 14,735 0.25 0.175 430.0
Gaubatz et al.10 GF (p100) 18,720 0.13 0.500 410.5
Wolkerstorfer11 GF (2191) 23,000 0.35 68.500 6.7
O¨tztu¨rk et al.12 GF (p166) 30,333 0.13 20.000 31.9
Table 4. ECC scalar point multiplication performance at 4 MHz.
Field multiplier
Combinational
logic blocks
Point
multiplier
Time
(s)
Code size
(bytes)
Data RAM
(bytes)
Precomputation
(bytes)
Software multiplier Binary 6.039 10,170 379 544
NAF 5.031 10,654 379
Montgomery 4.140 8,208 358
163 3 163 multiplier 245 Binary 0.264 2,936 294 0
NAF 0.224 3,014 294
Montgomery 0.169 2,048 273
163 3 163 4 digits 498 Binary 0.183 2,936 294 0
NAF 0.115 3,014 294
Montgomery 0.113 2,048 273
*NAF: nonadjacent form.
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er. In a bit-serial multiplier, only one bit of the
multiplicand is used in each iteration; however, in
a digit-serial multiplier, multiple bits (equal to the digit
size) are multiplied in each iteration. We use a digit size
of 4, since it yields a good speedup without drastically
increasing the area requirement. The total area for the
multiplier is 652 AND gates, 684 XOR gates, and 492 flip-
flops. A 163 3 163 multiplication with reduction
requires 42 clock cycles. In our implementation, the
control overhead results in a total of 193 clock cycles.
Our implementation results in Table 4 show that
huge performance gains are possible in small 8-bit
processors by introducing small amounts of extra
hardware. The results show an increase in speed of
one to two orders of magnitude for the ECC
implementation. Hardware costs are in the range of
250 to 500 extra combinational logic blocks (CLBs).
Also, code size and data RAM usage decrease. In an
ASIC-based ISE, where the hardware is more tightly
coupled, the control signal overhead can be consid-
erably reduced, permitting better efficiency.
Software realization of ECC
Using a hardware-software codesign can substan-
tially increase public-key performance with minimal
area. However, in some situations public-key cryptog-
raphy must be implemented purely in software
because changes to the hardware aren’t possible.
Here, we describe an implementation that proves that
public-key cryptography can indeed be used in low-
end 8-bit processors to provide adequate security for
low-end applications. We met these goals by leverag-
ing the computational savings provided by ECC.
For the implementation, we chose Mica motes.
They provide the 8-bit ATmega128L microcontroller,
which comprises 128 Kbytes of in-system reprogram-
mable flash, 4 Kbytes of electrically erasable pro-
grammable ROM (EEPROM), and 4 Kbytes of internal
SRAM. Themicrocontroller can handle up to 64 Kbytes
of optional external memory space.
As we saw previously, the efficiency of the finite-field
arithmetic, especially the field multiplication, deter-
mines an ECC’s overall efficiency. Because asymmetric
systems are as much as three orders of magnitude
slower than symmetric systems, the main focus is on
speed rather than code size. For the same reason, we
implemented a curve with a fixed bit length (a
standardized 160-bit curve chosen for security reasons).
This seems to be a reliable trade-off between security
and speed. We chose the curve secp160r1 (standard-
ized by Standards for Efficient Cryptography – SEC 2:
Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters, v1.0,
Certicom Research, 2000) for our implementation.
ECC’s core operation is the scalar multiplication k
3 P, where k is an integer and P is a point on an elliptic
curve. Depending on the protocol used, optimizations
to the scalar multiplication are possible; for example,
the elliptic-curve digital-signature algorithm (ECDSA)
protocol doesn’t require the y-coordinate. Not focusing
on a specific protocol, we usemore-general algorithms
to speed up the curve arithmetic to make it reusable
for many protocol-adapted curve implementations.
Because optimizations in the prime field arithmetic
will always improve the ECC system’s performance,
the main focus lies here.
Elliptic-curve arithmetic. The curve multiplication
might be changed or modified for each protocol, so
we implemented a simple binary left-to-right, double-
and-add algorithm. We used Jacobian projective
coordinates for the curve multiplication. This let us
avoid frequent use of the inversion, which is costly in
software. Only one inversion is needed at the end of
the curve multiplication to transform back to affine
coordinates. We used algorithms that mix affine and
Jacobian projective coordinates to significantly
increase speed. Storing one point in the SRAM
requires 320 bits in affine coordinates and 480 bits in
Jacobian projective coordinates. Hence, we traded
SRAM for speed by applying mixed coordinates
0
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Table 5. Performance of ECC scalar multiplication in software.
Finite-field multiplication Platform Time (ms) Time (103 cycles)
Binary multiplication, 160-bit prime field14 ATmega128L 810 6,480
Binary multiplication, 160-bit prime field13 ATmega128L 1,040 8,383
Binary multiplication, 134-bit OEF15 8,051 8,370 100,440
Window multiplication, 134-bit OEF15 8,051 1,830 21,960
*OEF: optimum extension field.
Design and Test of ICs for Secure Embedded Computing
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(Jacobian projective and affine). One multiplication
requires 8,383,488 clock cycles, translating to
1.04 seconds at 8 MHz. (Further implementation
details are available elsewhere.13) In Table 5, we list
several implementations for k 3 P.
Prime field arithmetic. The prime field arithmetic
must provide multiply, add, inversion, and reduction
operations; subtract, halve, and square operations are
optional. The latter three can also be realized by using
the former operations, but with additional overhead.
Hence, subtract and halve were also implemented. To
keep the code size moderate, we did not implement
the square operation.
Operations with the most potential for optimization
are multiplication and reduction. Because the prime
field is based on a pseudo-Mersenne prime, it’s
possible to reduce the prime field by mere shifts and
adds. The prime field arithmetic is completely
implemented in assembly, thereby minimizing code
size and optimizing performance. The greatest com-
putation cost lies in the 160-bit field multiplication.
SRAM operations and the microcontroller’s 8-bit
multiply instruction both need two clock cycles, so
we exclude precalculations. Furthermore, Karatsuba
multiplication does not result in a good trade-off on this
platform. In addition to the theoretical lower bound of
1,600 clock cycles, two bottlenecks occur here: SRAM
access, because the operands do not fit completely in
the registers; and carry handling, because the in-
termediate results need to be accumulated.
The hybrid multiplication14 is a schoolbook variant,
optimized for low SRAM access. The parameter
d indicates how many registers are used to minimize
SRAM access. Using more registers means fewer SRAM
operations are required. We implemented the hybrid
multiplication for d 5 5, which requires about half of
the microcontroller’s registers. This way, the remaining
registers can be used for efficient carry handling.13
Table 6 shows the code size, the number of clock
cycles, and the SRAM required for the various opera-
tions. The listed SRAM requirements are supplemented
in parentheses by thememory needed for the operands.
The code size of 5.44 Kbytes for the 160-bit multiplica-
tion is acceptable, as it is highly optimized for speed.
ESTABLISHED SYMMETRIC CIPHERS can be implemen-
ted with 3,400 GEs in hardware, and about 600 bytes
of code in the software case. Specialized symmetric
ciphers can further reduce the resource requirements
of hardware implementations to as few as 1,570 GEs
with reasonable performance. Contrary to common
belief, stream ciphers do not offer a substantial
advantage in resource-constrained applications for
either hardware or software.
Asymmetric cryptography with a secure bit length
realized in hardware still requires a significantly larger
chip (at least 10,000 additional GEs) than symmetric
cryptography, but it is already reasonably fast.
Hardware-software codesign seems to produce the
best trade-off between size and speed for many
pervasive computing applications. Nevertheless, care-
fully optimizing algorithms in software enables micro-
controllers to perform asymmetric operations in less
than 1 second, and this is sufficient for some
envisioned pervasive applications. &
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